15 Settembre 2025
Gaia Durante Mangoni
Beyond 'Welfare vs. Warfare': European Rearmament and Common Defense as Keys to Survival and Growth in THE CURRENT Geopolitical Landscape
There is no point in hiding it; Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 caught the European Union (EU) completely ill-prepared. After years of cuts to military spending and over-reliance on the United States (US), European armed forces and defense industries have wasted. This has made the support for Kyiv slow and strained. In this regard, a debate has emerged in recent months on the need for the EU to acquire military sovereignty and how to do so.
It is imperative to briefly reflect on the paradoxical nature of EU defense policy first. Given that this is a matter that remains under the authority of individual Member States (MS), the European Commission’s action is very limited, as it can only intervene if there is a unanimous request from the MS. To circumvent this structural flaw, and in response to its growing marginalization on issues that are purely European, the EU has launched a series of initiatives aimed at integrating its industrial base at the European level, thereby strengthening the continent’s defense industry.
The protests in Rome
Most of the Italian public opposes the €800 billion plan proposed by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on March 5, 2025. ReArm Europe – later renamed Readiness 2030 to appease scaremongers – provides MS with various tools to increase military spending, encouraging in particular joint programs between European partners. This opposition, led by far-right parties and the populist and radical left, materialized in protests held on various Sundays in the spring and summer of this year. At the “Stop Rearm Europe“ demonstration organized in Rome on June 21, 2025, some of the approximately 10,000 participants set fire to EU and Ukrainian flags, as well as cardboard tanks covered with European flags.
At the same time, Palestinian flags were waved in the air, as if, in the face of an occupation condemned by international law, double standards could be applied in the way of viewing the resistance of the occupied people.
In Italy, European rearmament and support for Ukraine are deeply unpopular topics, so much so that they even divide parties internally. This was demonstrated by the split within the Democratic Party (PD). Representatives Cecilia Strada and Marco Tarquinio were in Rome in a personal capacity, a presence that PD Senator Filippo Sensi openly criticized, while party leader Elly Schlein stayed away from the capital.
What explains this opposition?
The Eastern front perceived as too distant:
Italy’s reluctance to support Ukraine stems from its Mediterranean status, hence naturally more interested in the Southern front than the Eastern flank. If our main threat comes from the growing insecurity and instability in North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa – phenomena that are driving thousands of people toward our shores – why should we care about what happens to the Ukrainians, or even feel threatened by Russia, a country that is so far away and with which members of our government seem to get along?
A recent survey by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) confirms these assumptions. Out of a sample of 13 European countries, Italy is among those with the lowest number of nationals in favor of the idea that Europe should continue to help Kyiv regain the territories occupied by Moscow.
“Welfare VS Warfare”… But are they really that dichotomous?
The main cause for concern of Italian anti-militarists is that funds allocated to defense investments are diverted from public spending, including healthcare and education. However, the mantra “welfare versus warfare” alludes to a dangerously simplistic vision of the choice we are faced with. Defense investments must in fact be considered within the broader context of the EU’s reindustrialization.
Economists agree that to ensure its positive impact on economic growth, the increase in military-related investments must be accompanied by an increase in investments in Research and Development (R&D). It is no coincidence that investing heavily in R&D (AI, aerospace and semiconductors chiefly) is one of the recommendations in Mario Draghi’s report on the future of European competitiveness.
The framework agreements that Italy’s Center for Defense Higher Studies (CASD) has signed since 2020 with various Italian universities, including La Sapienza University in Rome and the Politecnico in Milan, are encouraging signs that move in this direction. These agreements enable the development of advanced training courses and study initiatives focused on STEM disciplines, strategic sciences and international security. These types of synergy between academia and the defense sector represent unique opportunities for Italy to grow, innovate and develop, while promoting holistic and interdisciplinary education. Merely aspiring to have engineers capable of developing and producing high-level military equipment and technologies in the absence of valid and cutting-edge educational systems is therefore unreasonable.
Furthermore, Italy’s Ministry of Economy and Finance has often provided significant support to Italian companies involved in defense and military production under the Italian brand, as they employ Italian labor and contribute to the development of the country’s industrial capabilities.
In essence, revitalizing the defense sector will not only benefit this sector in the short term, but it will also make the European and Italian economies more innovative and competitive in the future.
Interoperability as an asset:
Rethinking European military spending does not only mean spending more, but also spending better. To optimize costs and resources, and thus achieve its ambitious defense goals, Italy must prioritize investment in common weapons systems, thereby reducing asymmetries, duplication and waste. This intergovernmental effort is encapsulated in the concept of interoperability: allowing various national armies to use the same type of weapons, hence improving their operational effectiveness on the ground. In turn, this standardization of materials promotes partnerships (the so-called joint ventures) between European companies active in the defense sector, and stimulates competition between MS.
What has been done by Italy
In late July, Italy requested access to the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) program, an instrument that provides €150 billion in long-term loans (up to 45 years) at favorable rates to MS that submit joint projects to the European Commission aimed at investing in equipment and weapon systems whose components are at least 65% made in Europe. The €14 billion that Rome will receive over five years will be used to replenish its missile, ammunition and artillery stocks, which have been depleted since they were donated to Ukraine.
This decision is a promising first step toward enhancing Italy’s deterrence capabilities, promoting interoperability and fulfilling the commitment made by Meloni’s government last June at the NATO summit in The Hague to bring the defense budget to 3.5% of the national GDP by 2035.
From burden sharing to burden shifting
The reason why Italy must now equip itself with adequate defense capabilities so quickly and in such a sustained manner is simple: it has not done so in recent decades, abusing US generosity instead. Now that they are bluntly soliciting us, the US deem us Europeans to be parasites, spoiled and henceforth irrelevant. Kneeling at the mercy of hegemonic powers surely does not make one safer.
In light of this, it is time to do with security and defense policies what was done at the dawn of the Union with coal and steel, managing them at the community level and taking on a greater burden. Whether Italians like it or not, the Americans will gradually take less responsibility for European security; it would therefore be sensible to strengthen European conventional forces and learn to stand on our own two feet.
The art of the deal
Similarly, many Italian associations opposing rearmament criticize the trade agreement signed on July 27, 2025, between the EU and the US, not only because of the unfavorable tariff regime it imposes on Europeans, but also because the agreement forces them to considerably increase their purchases of American-made military equipment.
But to grasp the logic behind this deal, we should connect the dots: if they had not agreed on these key trade criteria, European leaders would probably not have found themselves sitting next to Ukrainian President Zelenskyy at the White House on August 18, and would not have had the opportunity to present themselves as a united front before the American President. This was, without any doubt, a classic move by the unpredictable, yet predictably deal-making president who, as is now well known, strikes multilateral agreements as if they were Manhattan real estate contracts.
Additionally, it is important to understand that adapting to Trump’s transactional approach not only benefits him but is, above all, in the interests of Europeans themselves. In International Relations, having the ability to defend oneself lends credibility to an actor in the eyes of allies and enemies alike, and it is precisely this virtue that determines whether one has a seat at the negotiating table on which the future of Europe will also depend.
Conclusione
To avoid finding itself in a position of vulnerability in an increasingly unstable international context, Europe must come to terms with a new reality in which the use of force has once again become a key tool for resolving international disputes. Pondering security and defense spending more strategically does not equate to being warmongers. And it is certainly not the programs proposed by the European Commission that have reignited an arms race. Instead, these are consequences and measures of adaptation to survive the increasingly frequent violations of international law in a precarious security context, to say the least. In short, defense is strengthened not to wage war, but rather to achieve and ensure peace more effectively: only a solid and credible deterrence posture can curb adversaries.
Had Ukraine had a stronger defense system, complemented by European security guarantees, Putin might have thought twice before invading.
This is why the divisions over rearmament that are deeply rooted in Italy only serve to distance Italians from the much-coveted European strategic autonomy, making them victims of a reckless illusion.
When threats common to several, if not all, MS are identified, the logical response would be to act collectively, coordinating action and avoiding fragmentation. For existential sectors such as defense, this means, first and foremost, a more integrated and more European production. Otherwise, by remaining divided and weak, we will be easier to devour.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Gaia holds a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations from King’s College London and is currently pursuing a Master’s in International Security at Sciences Po Paris.
She worked for a year in Brussels, first at Finabel, a research center focused on the interoperability of armed forces, and then at the International Crisis Group, an organization dedicated to conflict prevention, mediation, and resolution, for which she continues to serve as a consultant.
She has a strong interest in the interconnection between various security crises affecting Africa, the role of the actors involved (both internal and external, state and non-state), and the continent’s positioning within the contemporary international system. A firm supporter of the European integration process, she has a deep passion for studying the European Union’s defense and security policies.